Blog / A10:2021 Server-Side Request Forgery
A10:2021 · Server-Side Request Forgery

An unchecked test URL steers a browser through your tunnel

A configurable URL feeds a remote browser while a local tunnel is open. Set it to an internal address and the session reaches whatever the tunnel can.

test URL set inconfigpassed to remotebrowsertunnel exposesinternal networkbrowser fetchesinternal endpointATTACKER INPUTIMPACTinternal service reached
Attack path · test URL set in config → passed to remote browser → tunnel exposes internal network → browser fetches internal endpoint

A configurable URL feeds a remote browser while a local tunnel is open. Set it to an internal address and the session reaches whatever the tunnel can.

What goes wrong

A test target URL is accepted with no validation and passed to a remote-controlled browser as the page to open. On its own that is a browser visiting a page. The catch is that the session runs with a local tunnel enabled, which bridges that browser back into your own network.

So the destination matters far more than it looks. Whoever can set the URL, through the test environment or a shared pipeline config, can point the tunneled browser at internal HTTP endpoints that should never be reachable from outside. The browser becomes a proxy into whatever the tunnel opened.

Medium, because it needs influence over the test setup rather than an open path from the internet. In a CI system where plenty of people can edit a config, that bar is lower than it sounds.

The pattern

Vulnerable
const url = config.TEST_URL;  // unchecked
browser.goto(url);            // tunnel to internal net is live
Hardened
const url = config.TEST_URL;
const host = new URL(url).hostname;
if (!isPublic(host) || !allowedHosts.has(host)) {
  throw new Error('test url not allowed');
}
browser.goto(url);
How the pipeline adjudicated itPROVEN
ABCDEFGH

Every gate held. The exploit path was reproduced against a negative control, the impact was calibrated, and the finding was signed report-ready.

Ed25519 · per-tenant signing key · gate ledger A–H · verify offline against the published payload hash

Why it matters to you

A tunnel that lets your test browser reach staging also lets it reach anything else on that network. Once you combine 'the browser goes where the config says' with 'the browser can see the internal network,' that config value became a network reach control, and it usually is not treated like one. If many hands can edit the CI target, treat the target as untrusted.

Check your own code