Blog / A07:2021 Identification and Authentication Failures
A07:2021 · Identification and Authentication Failures

The Authorization header that says 'Authorization'

An outbound request sets its Authorization header to the literal word, not a token. Usually that just fails to authenticate. Sometimes that is the scarier outcome.

build outboundrequestset Authorizationto a…send to theidentity servicerequest carriesno…ATTACKER INPUTIMPACTcheck absent
Attack path · build outbound request → set Authorization to a literal string → send to the identity service → request carries no real credential

An outbound request sets its Authorization header to the literal word, not a token. Usually that just fails to authenticate. Sometimes that is the scarier outcome.

What goes wrong

Somewhere a copy-paste went sideways and the Authorization header on an outbound call got set to the string "Authorization" instead of an actual token. It reads like a placeholder that shipped.

Most of the time this fails closed. The receiving service sees garbage where a bearer token should be and rejects the call, so the feature is simply broken until someone notices. The reason it is worth a look rather than a shrug: if the downstream ever treats a malformed or missing credential as an anonymous-but-allowed path, the request could be accepted under an authentication route nobody intended. That depends entirely on how the other side handles a bad header, which is why this was flagged for evidence rather than called a breach.

The pattern

Vulnerable
function callIssuer(payload) {
  return http.post(issuerUrl, {
    headers: { Authorization: "Authorization" },  // literal, not a token
    body: payload
  })
}
Hardened
function callIssuer(payload, token) {
  if (!token) throw new Error("missing access token")
  return http.post(issuerUrl, {
    headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${token}` },
    body: payload
  })
}
How the pipeline adjudicated itDISPROVEN
ABCDEFGH

Grounding and reachability checked out, then the exploit-path gate failed to stand up. The pipeline recorded the finding as disproven and signed that result, so the same false alarm will not come back next quarter.

Ed25519 · per-tenant signing key · gate ledger A–H · verify offline against the published payload hash

Why it matters to you

This is a low-drama bug with a useful lesson. A credential built from a hard-coded string is a credential nobody is checking on the way out. The immediate effect is usually a broken integration, and the real question it raises is about the receiver: does your downstream fail closed when the Authorization header is wrong.

If you are not sure of that answer for every service you call, that uncertainty is the finding, not this one line.

Check your own code