Blog / A10:2021 Server-Side Request Forgery
A10:2021 · Server-Side Request Forgery

A caller-set response URL sends your credentials anywhere

The destination for the credential response came straight from caller input. Point it at your own server and the signed payload follows.

caller suppliesresponse URLused unchecked asPOST targetserver postssession…data reachesattacker hostATTACKER INPUTIMPACTinternal service reached
Attack path · caller supplies response URL → used unchecked as POST target → server posts session and credential → data reaches attacker host

The destination for the credential response came straight from caller input. Point it at your own server and the signed payload follows.

What goes wrong

In a credential exchange flow, the server posts the result back to a URL, and that URL came from the caller and was used exactly as given. There is no host allowlist and no check that it matches the request that was actually authorized.

Two things go wrong at once. The first is plain SSRF: the caller can aim that POST at an internal service, at loopback, or at the cloud metadata endpoint, using your server as the sender. The second is the payload. The POST body carries the authorization session and the serialized credential response, so the attacker can point it at their own server and collect signed credential material.

The response destination has to be bound to the request that was authenticated, not taken on trust. When it is caller-controlled, the two most sensitive properties of the flow, where it goes and what it carries, are both in the attacker's hands.

The pattern

Vulnerable
function finish(requestData, session) {
  const dest = requestData.responseUrl;  // caller-controlled
  post(dest, { session, credential: buildResponse() });
}
Hardened
function finish(requestData, session) {
  const dest = session.registeredResponseUrl;  // bound at request time
  if (!allowlisted(dest)) {
    return reject();
  }
  post(dest, { session, credential: buildResponse() });
}
How the pipeline adjudicated itPROVEN
ABCDEFGH

Every gate held. The exploit path was reproduced against a negative control, the impact was calibrated, and the finding was signed report-ready.

Ed25519 · per-tenant signing key · gate ledger A–H · verify offline against the published payload hash

Why it matters to you

If any part of a request tells your server where to send the answer, someone will tell it to send the answer to them. This shows up wherever a callback URL or a webhook target rides in on the request. Decide the destination from state you established and trust, then refuse anything else. High severity here because the payload is credential data and the target is arbitrary.

Check your own code