Blog / A01:2021 Broken Access Control
A01:2021 · Broken Access Control

Your BLE device answers reads from anyone in range

A connected peer requests a characteristic and the handler returns its value with success. No bond state, no identity check. Radio range is the only barrier.

peer connectsover BLEpeer requests acharacteristic…handler skipsidentity and…current valuereturned…ATTACKER INPUTIMPACTcheck absent
Attack path · peer connects over BLE → peer requests a characteristic read → handler skips identity and bond checks → current value returned with success

A connected peer requests a characteristic and the handler returns its value with success. No bond state, no identity check. Radio range is the only barrier.

What goes wrong

The read handler treats "connected" as "allowed." When a peer asks for a characteristic, the code returns the current value and reports success. It never checks whether the device is bonded or whether that device should see the data. On BLE, connecting is cheap, so anyone in range who reaches the link layer can start reading.

If the characteristic holds anything sensitive, say a session token or transfer details, it is now readable by an unauthorized peer. Link-layer bonding and encryption are not the same as application authorization, and plenty of stacks let a peer connect without either. The characteristic's own permissions are where you enforce this, and here they sit wide open.

The pattern

Vulnerable
function onReadRequest(device, characteristic):
    // connection treated as permission
    value = characteristic.value
    // no bond state or session check
    respond(SUCCESS, value)
    return
Hardened
function onReadRequest(device, characteristic):
    if (!device.isBonded()):
        respond(INSUFFICIENT_AUTHENTICATION, null)
        return
    if (!session.isAuthorized(device, characteristic)):
        respond(INSUFFICIENT_AUTHORIZATION, null)
        return
    respond(SUCCESS, characteristic.value)
How the pipeline adjudicated itHELD
ABCDEFGH

Grounding and reachability were confirmed. The exploit-path gate would not conclude without the calling code, so the finding was held and an evidence request was raised instead of being reported as fact.

Ed25519 · per-tenant signing key · gate ledger A–H · verify offline against the published payload hash

Why it matters to you

Physical proximity is a weak boundary. A device sitting in a bag or a waiting room is reachable by anyone nearby with a cheap radio. If your threat model assumes only trusted peers connect, the radio does not share that assumption. Sensitive characteristics need an authorization check in the handler, tied to a bonded and authenticated session.

Check your own code